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The Australian law concerning real property is derived from the law of England. Ownership 
of land in England in the middle ages constituted the wealth of the country. Land included 
not only the surface of the property, but the owner of the soil was also the owner of  
everything  “up to the sky and down to the centre of the earth”.1 Due to the importance 
placed on the ownership of land, very little law was made in regards to personal property.2 
The owners of land were the law makers and therefore the laws developed protected their 
interest in real property. Laws were developed to settle disputes as to title to chattels that 
tenants of the land owners had affixed to the land.3 As early as 1365 an Ordinance was 
enacted in London regulating what chattels tenants could remove upon the expiry of the 
term of the lease.4 Under these circumstances, the law of fixtures evolved - quicquid 
plantatur solo, solo cedit - that which is affixed to the soil, belongs to the soil. Under this 
doctrine, chattels which are attached to land become part of that land, changing status from 
personal property to real property. 
 
As trade and commerce developed, the value of chattels was recognised and laws were 
developed in their protection. Despite this development, the classification of real and 
personal property is basically unchanged since feudal times.5 As noted by commentators, 
the doctrine of fixtures was destined to be controversial and even in 1883, the law of fixtures 
was regarded as “both inequitable in its principle and injurious in its effect to the spirit of 
improvement”.6 
 
The unique ability of chattels to change from the status of personal property to real property 
has caused problems from the time the doctrine of fixtures was evolved - disputes as to 
priority to fixtures are an age old problem.7 Competing claims to fixtures arise in many 
relationships - lessor and lessee, vendor and purchaser of land, mortgagor and mortgagee, 
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7 As can be seen by the enactment of the ordinance in 1365, noted above. 
life tenant and reversioner and mortgagee and grantee under a bill of sale. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to examine the rights in respect of chattels affixed to land of all parties 
in these relationships. It is therefore intended to concentrate on the competing interests 
between a grantee under a bill of sale and a mortgagee of land. This area of the law 
involves much conflict and needs to be resolved. The Bills of Sale legislation creates 
particular problems as it allows fixtures to be treated as chattels, adding to the dilemma. It is 
intended to discuss the doctrine of fixtures, the rights to fixtures of mortgagees and 
grantees and to  examine the adequacy of the Bills of Sale legislation and the application of 
the common law in resolving disputes as to priorities to fixtures. 
 
 
[2] Definition of a Fixture 
The starting point of defining what a fixture is, is the Latin maxim - quicquid plantatur solo, 
solo cedit - that which is affixed to the soil, belongs to the soil. This is a very broad 
statement of the law and is no longer the strict truth, as was acknowledged by Lindley LJ in 
Gough v Wood & Co.8 In determining whether a chattel has become a fixture, the courts 
have identified two factors which are relevant - the degree of annexation of the item to the 
land; and the purpose or object of the annexation. The modern test for determining whether 
an item was a fixture was stated by Jordan CJ in Australian Provincial Co Ltd v Coroneo: 
 
A fixture is a thing once a chattel which has become in law land through having 
been fixed to the land. The question whether a chattel has become a fixture 
depends upon whether it has been fixed to the land, and if so for what purpose. If a 
chattel is actually fixed to land to any extent by any means other than its own weight 
then prima facie it is a fixture; and the burden of proof is upon anyone who asserts 
that it is not: if it is not otherwise fixed but is kept in position by its own weight, then 
prima facie it is not a fixture; and the burden of proof is on anyone who asserts that 
it is.9 
 
[2.1] Degree of Annexation 
This test requires the method by which the chattel is attached to the land to be examined. 
There are two presumptions made in relation to the degree of annexation as noted by 
Jordan CJ in Australian Provincial Co Ltd v Coroneo.10 If a chattel is attached to the land by 
no more than its weight, prima facie it remains a chattel.11 Conversely, is a chattel is 
attached by more than merely its weight, it is presumed to be a fixture.12 These 
presumptions are now not conclusive and do no more than establish which party bears the 
onus of proof.13 
 
[2.2] Purpose of Annexation 
In determining the status of a chattel today, the courts place greater importance on the 
actual purpose of the annexation. The purpose or intention is inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances. The test is what the reasonable person would consider the reason for 
                                                           
8 [1894] 1 QB 713 at 719. 
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attaching the chattel to the land.14  Evidence of the actual intention of the person who 
brought the chattel onto the land, is merely one factor to be taken into account.15 Griffiths 
CJ in Reid v Smith stated: 
The intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent 
accession to the freehold, this intention to be inferred from the nature of the article 
affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure 
and mode of annexation, and the purpose and use of which the annexation has 
been made, is a controlling circumstance in determining whether the structure is to 
be regarded as a fixture or not.16 
 
In determining the intention with which the chattel was placed on the land, several factors 
are taken into account: 
 
· the nature of the chattel; 
· the manner in which it was utilised; 
· the period of time for which it was affixed, that is, a temporary or indefinite period; 
· the degree of annexation; 
· the purpose for which the chattel was brought onto the land; and 
• any agreements between the owner of the chattel and the owner of the land, including 
any statements of intention by those persons.17 
 
It is open for parties to enter into an agreement as to the status of the article. It is common 
for bills of sale to provide that the grantor is not to affix the chattels, which are subject to the 
charge, to land. However, such provision or agreement does not prevent the chattel from 
becoming a fixture, should the chattel be attached to real property. As noted from the tests 
adopted by the courts, any such agreement is a circumstance taken into account in 
determining whether the article is a fixture or a chattel.18 In NH Dunn Pty Ltd v LM Ericsson 
Pty Ltd,19 it was held that where the owner of the chattel and the owner of the land had 
agreed as to the status of the chattel, although the agreement was relevant, it did not assist 
the rights of others, such as mortgagees.20 As stated by AL Smith LJ in Hobson v Gorringe: 
 
...when dealing with the “circumstances to shew intention”, was contemplating and 
referring to circumstances which shewed the degree of annexation and the object of 
the annexation which were patent for all to see, and not the circumstances of some 
chance agreement that might or might not exist between an owner of a chattel and a 
hirer thereof.21 
 
[2.3] Chattels as Fixtures 
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Therefore, despite any agreement or the intention of the parties with interests in the chattel 
as to its status, a chattel will become part of the land if the purpose and degree of 
annexation are sufficient to satisfy the tests. This raises problems when chattels which are 
subject of a bill of sale become affixed to land. Upon satisfying the tests as to purpose and 
degree of annexation, the chattel will become part of the real property to which it is 
attached. If the land is mortgaged, the mortgagee and the grantee under the bill of sale will 
both claim title to the item. 
 
[3] Mortgagee’s Interest in Fixtures 
Assuming that, on the basis of the above tests, a chattel has become a fixture, it is 
necessary to examine the extent to which a mortgage of land will encompass such fixtures. 
It is established, that fixtures that are annexed to land that is subject to a mortgage form 
part of the security. Lord Lindley held in Reynolds v Ashby & Son: 
There is a long series of decisions of the highest authority shewing conclusively that 
as between a mortgagor and a mortgagee machines, fixed as these were to land 
mortgaged, pass to the mortgagee as part of the land.22 
Although Reynolds v Ashby & Son was decided under the old system of land, the principle 
has been applied to Torrens land without question. In Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v 
CSR Provident Nominees Pty Ltd, Adam J stated: 
...it seems clear that the mortgagee upon registration of its mortgage became 
entitled to treat as part of the mortgaged property any fixtures annexed thereto by 
the hirer, whether before or after the giving of the mortgage.23  
This applies even despite the fact that the mortgagor does not have title to the chattels 
which have been affixed to the land. This operates as an exception to the nemo dat quod 
non habet rule - he who does not have cannot give title24 as “title to the chattels may clearly 
be lost by being affixed to real property by a person who is not the owner of the chattels.”25 
Upon the chattel becoming part of the land, the mortgagee gains an interest, irrespective of 
whether the fixtures were annexed before or after the mortgage.26 
 
[3.1] Implied Authority by Mortgagee 
Although the mortgagee can claim an interest in the fixtures, a mortgagor retains the right to 
deal with those fixtures if the mortgagor is not in default of the terms of the mortgage. In 
Gough v Wood & Co,27 the defendant affixed a boiler and pipes to the business premises of 
a lessee. Under the terms of the agreement, the defendant had the right to enter the 
premises and remove the chattels upon default in payment. After this agreement, the lessee 
mortgaged his interest in the land to the plaintiff. The lessee defaulted under the agreement 
with the defendant and the defendant removed the chattels. The plaintiff mortgagee brought 
an action against the defendant for removing the boiler. 
 
The court held that by leaving the lessee/mortgagor in possession there was an implied 
authority on the mortgagee’s part, that the mortgagor may carry on their business and affix 
and remove fixtures necessary for the business.28 This principle appears to have developed 
                                                           
22 [1904] AC 460 at 473. 
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25 Reynolds v Ashby & Son [1904] AC 466 at 475, per Lord Lindley. 
26 Mather v Fraser (1856) 25 LJ Ch 361; Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund 
Nominees Pty Ltd [1962] VR 429 at 438. See also s239 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). 
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in order to allow trade and commerce to develop.29  Until the mortgagee takes possession 
of the mortgaged land, the mortgagor has the right to deal with the trade fixtures. Fletcher 
LJ in Ellis v Glover and Hobson Ltd stated: 
...in general a mortgagor in possession has the right to permit trade fixtures to be 
fixed and unfixed on the premises, provided they are unfixed before the mortgagee 
takes possession, but that right to unfix them ceases when possession is taken by 
the mortgagees.30 
 
These cases were decided under the old system of land where a mortgage involved the 
actual transfer of the land to the mortgagee by deed of conveyance with the immediate right 
of possession.31 Under the Torrens system, a mortgage takes effect as a charge over the 
land upon registration.32 As a mortgagor of a Torrens mortgage is not “left in possession” of 
the land, there would appear to be little use of the authorities as to implied authority to deal 
with fixtures in modern law. As owner of the mortgaged land, the mortgagor must have the 
right to attach and remove fixtures. This right would be subject to any provision in the terms 
of the mortgage, prohibiting the mortgagor from removing fixtures.33 
 
However, despite this change in the character of the mortgage, courts still refer to the 
implied authority to deal with fixtures. For example, in Trust Bank Central Ltd v Southdown 
Properties Ltd,34 a clause of the mortgage prohibited the removal, dismantling or structural 
alteration of buildings or improvements without the written consent of the mortgagee. The 
court held that the clause expressly negated any implied authority for the mortgagor to deal 
with fixtures and the fixtures which had been removed had been removed wrongfully by the 
supplier, notwithstanding any entitlement under a Romalpa clause of the supplier of the 
chattels.35 It appears that the courts continue to accept that there is an implied authority, 
without considering that a registered mortgagor remains the owner of the land and is 
entitled to possession until the mortgagee exercises its rights.  
 
As to restricting the right to deal with fixtures to trade fixtures, Robertson J found that there 
was “nothing jurisprudentially sacred about the exception being limited to trade fixtures.”36 
His Honour extended the exception to include mortgages of land on which major 
construction is occurring and the mortgagee has knowledge of this. This extends the 
exception to fixtures which are brought onto the land for the benefit of trade, although are 
not trade fixtures themselves. Robertson J held that this was the principle behind the 
exception, and there was no reason why it would not apply to the case before him.37 
 
It is only upon default by the mortgagor, either under the terms of the mortgage or the bill of 
sale, that it will be of importance to determine whether an item is a fixture or a chattel. If the 
chattel has not become a fixture then the mortgagee cannot claim an interest, as the chattel 
does not form part of the security. However, if a chattel has become a fixture, it will then be 
                                                           
29 Poole’s case (1703) 1 Salk 368. 
30 [1938] 1 KB 388 at 396. 
31 Santley v Wilde [1899] 2 Ch 474. 
32 Section 74 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). 
33 As noted by A Robertson in ‘Competing Priority Claims to Fixtures’, in Enforcing Securities, eds J 
Greig & B Horrigan, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1994, p 222, it would be unusual today for a mortgage of a 
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34 (1992) ANZ ConvR 247. 
35 Ibid at 251. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
necessary to establish which party has priority of title. The mortgagee will claim a right to 
the fixtures as part of its security and the grantee will naturally claim title by virtue of the bill 
of sale.  
 
[4] Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld) 
The Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld) provides for the registration of bills 
of sale of chattels. A bill of sale is a written instrument which: 
(a) assigns or transfers the chattels to the grantee;  
(b) is a power of attorney, authority or licence to take possession of the chattels as 
security for a debt; or  
(c) an agreement which confers a legal or equitable right to any chattels, charge or 
security thereon.38 
 
[4.1] Definition of Chattels 
“Chattels” is defined in the Act to include trade machinery, furniture, goods, chattels and 
other articles capable of complete transfer by delivery.39  The definition also includes 
fixtures, if separately assigned or charged. If a mortgage instrument includes fixtures, 
s6(1)(f) Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld) provides that for the purposes of 
the Act, those fixtures are not chattels. Therefore, the mortgage will not be a bill of sale 
under the legislation. However, this exemption does not apply to trade machinery which is 
affixed to land when assigned with an interest in the land.40 Trade machinery retains its 
status of chattel even if affixed to land for the purposes of the Act. Therefore, from the 
definition of “chattel”, it appears that a mortgage instrument which deals with trade 
machinery attached to land or which separately charges the fixtures of the land, comes 
within the ambit of the bills of sale legislation. 
 
[4.2] Registration of the Mortgage as a Bill of Sale 
If a mortgage is given over chattels, as defined in the Act, it is registerable as a bill of sale. 
Failure to register may have implications in any subsequent dispute as to priority to the 
chattels. Complications arise where the mortgage of chattels is combined with a mortgage 
of land. 
 
[4.2.1] Trade machinery 
In Re Yates; Ex parte Batcheldor v Yates,41 the English Court of Appeal rejected the 
argument that a mortgage over land to which trade machinery was affixed must be 
registered as a bill of sale. The court held, that to be registerable as a bill of sale under the 
Bills of Sale Act 1878 (Eng), there would still have to be a disposition of the trade machinery 
as chattels.42 Therefore, a mortgage over land which included trade machinery as fixtures, 
need only be registered as a bill of sale if the trade machinery is separately assigned.43  
 
[4.2.2] Fixtures (other than trade machinery) 
For fixtures to be considered as chattels under the Act, they must be separately assigned or 
charged.44 Section 6(3) provides that fixtures are not deemed to be separately assigned 
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39 Ibid. 
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41 (1888) 38 ChD 112. 
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interpretation. 
44 Section 6(1)(b) Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld), definition of “chattels”. 
merely because there is a power to sever them from the land, if the instrument also conveys 
an interest in land. Professor Sykes45 argues that s6 Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 
1955 (Qld) is merely declatory and that: 
properly understood, the legislation merely provides that, where fixtures are 
disposed of by the same instrument, the fact that the power to sever the fixtures is 
given is not to be taken in itself as meaning that they are separately assigned.46 
It is therefore possible for a mortgage which separately charges the fixtures, to be within the 
application of the Act. However, if the fixtures are merely assigned with the land under the 
mortgage, the mortgage instrument is not a bill of sale. 
 
[4.3] Meaning of “Separate Assignment” 
Section 83(1)(a) Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) grants the mortgagee “a power to sell...the 
mortgaged property, or any part thereof”. It has been held that similar statutory provisions 
do not give the mortgagee the right to sell any fixtures to the mortgaged land separately. 
Applying the English decision of Re Yates; Ex parte Batcheldor v Yates,47 von Doussa J in 
Re Penning; Ex parte State Bank of South Australia,48 held that whether the mortgagee has 
the power to sever fixtures and sell them separately from the land is dependant upon there 
being provision for such acts in the terms of the mortgage. The mortgage instrument is not 
read with the statute provisions to grant such a power.49 In the recent decision of Re JB 
Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq),50 MacKenzie J discussed the effect of s83 Property Law Act 
1974 (Qld) on the mortgagee’s right to sever fixtures. His Honour agreed with the limitation 
on the statutory power: 
In my view the scope of s83 is delimited by s83(4) and thus the power of sale in s83 
is limited to instruments of mortgage of land [and thus] s83 does not confer power to 
sell [personal] property.51 
The statutory implied incidental power refers to part of the mortgaged land, distinct from 
chattels that have been affixed to the land.52 Therefore, for the mortgagee to be entitled to 
sever and sell any fixtures separately from the land, the mortgage instrument must confer 
that power expressly. 
 
Once fixtures are detached from the land, they revert to their character of chattels.53 A 
mortgage that contains a power of severance and sale thereby allows a mortgagee to deal 
with chattels as security. Therefore, the question arises whether a mortgage instrument 
containing such a power is registerable as a bill of sale? 
 
In the English Court of Appeal decision of Ex parte Daglish,54 it was held that a mortgage 
instrument was registerable under the Bills of Sale Act 1854 (Eng) as it gave the mortgagee 
                                                           
45 EI Sykes & S Walker, The Law of Securities: An Account of the Law Pertaining to Securities over Real 
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46 Ibid at 624. 
47 (1888) 38 ChD 112. 
48 (1989) 89 ALR 417. 
49 Ibid at 430-431. 
50 [1990] 1 QdR 129. 
51 Ibid at 132. 
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53 RE Megarry & HWR Wade, The Law of Real Property, above, n 25, p 731. 
54 (1873) LR 8 Ch 1072. 
a power to sever the fixtures from the mortgaged land and sell them separately. This power 
in the mortgage was effectively a separate assignment of the fixtures.55 
 
If the instrument grants the mortgagee the power to sell the fixtures separately from the 
land, the mortgage treats the fixtures as a separate realisable security. In such a situation, 
there is more than mere assignment of the fixtures by the mortgage instrument. 
 
This view is in agreement with the judgment of von Doussa J in Re Penning; Ex parte State 
Bank of South Australia.56 In that case, a mortgagee entered into possession of land upon 
the default of the mortgagor. Erected upon the land were “A-frame” cabins which were held 
to be fixtures, forming part of the security. The mortgagee severed and sold the cabins 
separately from the  land. The mortgagor challenged the sale, arguing that the mortgagee 
could only deal with the fixtures if they were separately assigned or charged and the 
security registered under the relevant Bills of Sale legislation. 
 
His Honour held that as the mortgage instrument did not include a provision expressly 
giving the mortgagee the power to sever and sell the fixtures, there was no need for the 
instrument to be registered as a bill of sale.57 In Re Yates; Batcheldor v Yates,58 Cotton LJ 
stated that a mortgage which encompassed fixtures, but did not grant the right to sever and 
sell the fixtures separately, was not a bill of sale as the mortgage was “a mere conveyance 
of land” and was not to be considered as an assurance of chattels.59 von Doussa J 
reasoned that it was implicit in Cotton LJ’s judgment that a mortgage which included a 
power to sever and sell fixtures separately from the land would be within the definition of a 
“bill of sale” as it went beyond a “mere conveyance of land”: 
...if a mortgage included a power to sever fixtures and sell them separately from the 
land it would be no “mere conveyance of land”. In my opinion an instrument 
including such a power would fall within the definition of “bill of sale”. Such an 
instrument is not protected from registration.60 
 
Therefore, a mortgage with the power to sever and sell fixtures separately from the land, is 
an instrument which separately charges and assigns the fixtures, and must be registered as 
a bill of sale for protection. For the purposes of the Act, fixtures, although attached to the 
land, are classified as chattels. Fixtures which a  mortgagee is entitled to sever and sell by 
the terms of the mortgage have the dual classification of being both fixtures and chattels for 
security purposes.  
 
[4.4] Effect of Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld)  
The Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld) does not require bills of sale which 
are subject to the Act to be registered, but those instruments which remain unregistered 
shall not be enforceable against any person other than between the grantor and the 
grantee.61 Section 7(2)(b) Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld) provides that 
instruments that are registered are entitled to priority according to the time of registration. 
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57 Ibid at 427-428. 
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59 Ibid at 123. 
60 Re Penning; Ex parte State Bank of South Australia (1989) 89 ALR 417 at 430. 
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Once a bill of sale is registered under the Act, all persons, with the exception of prior 
registered grantees, are deemed to have notice of the instrument and its contents.62 
 
[4.4.1] One security instrument registered as a bill of sale  
If a mortgage which separately charges the fixtures is not registered as a bill of sale, the 
mortgagee is at risk of its interest in the fixtures being lost upon severance, should another 
bill of sale be registered in relation to those fixtures. The mortgagee will lose title to the 
severed fixtures if a grantee has a registered bill of sale over those fixtures, by virtue of s7 
of the Act. A grantee will have priority over the mortgagee even if the mortgage was first in 
time, if the mortgage instrument has not been registered as a bill of sale. 
 
A mortgage instrument registered as a bill of sale due to the provision permitting severance 
and sale of fixtures, would be entitled to priority over any bill of sale pertaining to the fixtures 
on the land that are registered after the mortgage was registered as a bill of sale, and over 
any unregistered bills of sale.63  The mortgagee’s priority will prevail even if the later bill of 
sale is over chattels which are annexed to the mortgaged land after the mortgage has been 
registered. A mortgagee’s security includes fixtures that are attached before or after the 
mortgage comes into existence.64 
 
[4.4.2] Mortgage and bill of sale registered 
If the mortgage had been registered as a bill of sale as well as the grantee’s bill of sale, the 
question of priority will be determined by the date of registration under s7(2)(b) of the Act. 
The instrument which had been registered first in time will have priority. 
 
[4.4.3] Unregistered bills of sale 
As noted above, the Act does not actually require bills of sale to be registered. Failure to 
register the mortgage as a bill of sale does not invalidate the mortgage instrument, though 
the part of the mortgage which purports to separately charge the fixtures will be void against 
third parties.65 Therefore, the mortgagee could not enforce its right to the fixtures against a 
grantee as a third party, but the provision would still be enforceable against the mortgagor.  
 
If neither the bill of sale nor the mortgage containing the power to sever and sell are 
registered under the Act, as to which party has priority would depend on which party has the 
better equity. The grantee’s interest arises from the charge created over the chattels and 
the mortgagee’s interest originates from the mortgage. Priority of title to the fixtures would 
be based on the ordinary principles of competing equities - the first in time prevails subject 
to any act by either party to postpone their interest.66  The party which loses its interest in 
the fixtures would be left to seek redress from the mortgagor under either the terms of the 
mortgage or the bill of sale. 
 
[5] Priority Disputes Between Mortgagee and Grantee as to Fixtures not Separately 
Charged Under the Mortgage 
                                                           
62 Ibid, s8. 
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The most common scenario giving rise to a dispute as to priority occurs where either a 
grantee or a registered mortgagee attempts to deal with the fixtures upon default by the 
grantor/mortgagor. Under the Torrens system, registered interests take priority over 
unregistered interests. Upon registration, a party obtains indefeasible title, subject to certain 
exceptions.67 In Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund Nominees Pty Ltd 
Adam J stated: 
...it seems clear that the mortgagee upon registration of its mortgage became 
entitled to treat as part of the mortgaged property any fixtures annexed thereto by 
the hirer, whether before or after the giving of the mortgage. Accordingly, as 
between such equitable interests as the plaintiffs had in the mortgaged land by 
reason of the annexation of plant and machinery thereto, and the mortgagee’s 
powers and rights as registered mortgagee, the latter were paramount.68 
His Honour classified the owner of the former chattel’s interest as an equitable interest in 
land. However, the exact nature of this equitable interest is far from clear. 
 
[5.1] Grantee’s Interest in Fixtures 
By virtue of s40 and the 5th Schedule of Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld), 
a grantee is entitled to enter the land upon which the chattels are kept, seize the chattels 
and sell them upon the default of the grantor under the bill of sale. The right is subject to 
any modification by the terms of the bill of sale. 
 
A bill of sale bestows upon the grantee an interest in the chattel. Is this interest extinguished 
upon the chattel being annexed to the land of the grantor? Upon annexation to land, a 
chattel becomes a fixture and it becomes part of that land. The title of the former chattel 
vests in the owner of the land to which it is affixed. If the land is subject to a mortgage, the 
mortgagee gains an interest in the fixture as the it forms part of the security.69 However, as 
the cases below indicate, the interest of the grantee converts to an equitable interest in the 
land to which the chattel has been affixed and is extinguished upon the mortgagee 
exercising powers under the mortgage.  
 
The equitable interest of the grantee appears to have been developed by the courts to 
overcome the problem of the change in character of a chattel to real property. As shown 
below, this equitable interest does not bare up upon closer scrutiny, leaving many issues 
debatable in determining priority between a mortgagee and a grantee. 
 
The most cited Australian case on this point is the decision of Adam J of the Supreme Court 
of Victoria in Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund Nominees Pty Ltd.70 
 The case involved a dispute between a finance company, which had leased certain chattels 
under a hire-purchase agreement to the mortgagor, and the mortgagee of the land. The 
chattels had become fixtures on the mortgaged land. The hire-purchase agreement 
provided that the finance company had the right to enter the mortgagor’s premises and 
seize and remove the chattels upon default under the agreement. The mortgagor defaulted 
under the mortgage to the land and the mortgagee purported to sever and sell those fixtures 
separate from the land. 
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Adam J found that the right of re-entry contained in the hire-purchase agreement amounted 
to a “species of equitable interest which entitled [the finance company], as against the 
[mortgagor], to enter upon the premises and sever and remove the chattels which had 
become fixtures”.71  This equitable right arises upon the grantee having the right to enter 
onto the land and seize the chattels that are subject of the bill of sale, it is not traced 
through from the interest in the chattel which transforms into a fixture thereby becoming part 
of the land.  
 
Commentators have stated that should the grantee have no such right, express or implied, 
no equitable interest in land will arise and the grantee’s rights will be in personam only.72 In 
his judgment of Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund Nominees Pty 
Ltd,73 Adam J reviewed the authorities on the existence of the equitable interest and in 
relation to the requirement that there be an express right of entry, stated that he did not take 
this to be a deciding essential feature.74 Therefore, it could be argued that where a third 
party has an interest in the chattels which have become fixtures on the mortgaged land, an 
implied right to seize those chattels is sufficient to create an equitable interest in the land in 
the third party’s favour.75 
 
[5.1.1] Nature of the grantee’s equitable interest 
From a study of the cases,76 it appears that the courts created and accepted the equitable 
interest in land of the owner of chattels affixed to land to alleviate the harsh and unjust 
outcome of strictly applying the doctrine of fixtures. But as one commentator has noted, 
despite the judicial acceptance of the existence of the equitable interest of the chattel 
owner, the owner rarely gains priority of title to the affixed chattels when competing with a 
mortgagee.77 Cooper argues that the courts have accepted that an equitable interest exists 
without any discussion of the principles involved, they have simply created the equitable 
interest.78  
 
An equitable interest possesses certain characteristics: 
 
1. the power to specifically recover the land, or its income (in contrast to the recovery 
of compensation or damages); 
2. the power to transfer or assign the interest; and 
3. the ability to trace the land into the hands of third parties.79 
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From the cases, the character of the grantee’s equitable interest does not meet the 
elements of the recognised equitable interest. The grantee’s interest arises from the right to 
enter the land. Therefore, a grantee has no power to recover the land, nor trace the land if it 
passes to third parties. The interest in the chattels which is subject to the bill of sale may be 
transferred, but there is no transfer of an interest in the land by the grantee. Commentators 
have attempted to clearly identify the interest, but there is no consensus except that the 
right is not a licence, nor a profit à prendre.80 
 
Hogg also points out the “bizarre” theory of the equitable interest.81 He notes that the 
mortgagor never intended to create an interest in the land, the right to enter and remove 
chattels being merely a contractual right. In Carter Holt Larvey Ltd v Southern Cross 
Building Society,82 an application was made in respect of a caveat lodged to protect a 
vendor’s equitable interest based on the right to enter and sever contained in a Romalpa 
clause. Master Gambrill concluded that such a right did not create anything more than a 
contractual licence: 
The agreement to give a right of entry is not expressed in a form that purports to 
establish more than an individual right of entry and there is no expression of intent 
to create an interest in land as such that would be recognised under the provisions 
of the Land Transfer Act 1952 (NZ).83 
 
Of note is the recent decision Whenuapai Joinery (1988) Ltd v Trust Bank Central Ltd.84 The 
court stated that although there was no cross-appeal as to the fact that a right to enter and 
seize goods under a Romalpa clause created an equitable interest, “[w]e must not however 
be taken as necessarily agreeing with it.”85 
 
The equitable interest in the land of the grantee arises from the right to enter, not from the  
annexation of the chattel to the land. However, despite the weakness of the precedents, it is 
firmly entrenched in the law that an equitable interest in the land exists in favour of the 
owner of the chattel. Using logic, it would make more sense that upon annexation an 
interest in a chattel converts to a limited interest in the land, corresponding with the change 
in the status of the chattel. This interest would be limited to the actual fixture itself, not the 
entire land. However, as noted by Cox J in Hazelwood v BP Australia Ltd,86 the extent of the 
interest in the land could be dependent upon the nature and position of the fixtures. 
 
[5.2] Acts Inconsistent with the Existence of the Equitable Interest 
A grantee will lose the right to enter the mortgaged land and sever the fixtures which are 
subject to the bill of sale and thereby lose any claim to the fixtures, when the mortgagee 
exercises its powers “in a manner inconsistent with the continued existence of the equitable 
interests”87 of the grantee. As to what exactly amounts to an act inconsistent with the 
equitable interest is not clear. 
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In Ellis v Glover & Hobson Ltd,88 the court appeared to indicate that the implied authority of 
the mortgagor to sell and remove fixtures, could be terminated upon the mortgagee entering 
into possession of the mortgaged land, although it did not expressly state this. 89 However, 
in Reynolds v Ashby & Son,90 it was clearly stated that once a mortgagee had taken 
possession of the land, any rights of third parties in the fixtures were lost in favour of the 
mortgagee.91 In Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund Nominees Pty 
Ltd,92 Adam J refers to the mortgagee exercising its powers and rights. His Honour stated 
that the exercise of the power of sale under the relevant property legislation would override 
the equitable interest, as would entering into possession of the mortgaged land and 
proceeding for a foreclosure order.93 
 
Is the equitable interest extinguished upon the mortgagee actually exercising a right under 
the mortgage, or is it extinguished upon the default of the mortgagor of the land giving rise 
to the potential for a mortgagee to act? In Sanwa Australia Leasing Ltd v National 
Westminster Finance Australia,94 Powell J purporting to follow the authority of Kay’s 
Leasing, held that the act inconsistent with the equitable interest under the lease agreement 
dealing with machinery, was the actual sale of the land by the mortgagee. The mortgagee 
had actually gone into possession, but as the lessor of the machinery objected to the sale of 
the machinery before the mortgagee sold the land upon which it was annexed, his Honour 
held that the lessor retained priority. 
...as the plaintiff [lessor] moved to exercise its right prior to their being overreached 
by the exercise, by the defendant [mortgagee], of its power of sale, and as the 
plaintiff’s application for an injunction was compromised in the manner in which I 
have recorded, the plaintiff’s rights ought, prima facie, to be regarded as having 
retained their priority.95 
 
Commentators have suggested that Powell J has based this decision on an incorrect 
extension of the ratio in Kay’s Leasing.96 Adam J merely cites the sale of the mortgaged 
property as an example where there could be no doubt that the mortgagee had 
extinguished the equitable interest. From his Honour’s judgment, the fact that there is the 
potential for the mortgagee to exercise powers under the mortgage is not sufficient to 
extinguish the equitable interest of the grantee. There must be default and an act by the 
mortgagee, giving rise to a legal right. An inconsistent act needs to be such that it is denial 
of the grantee’s interest. 
 
Should a mortgagor default under the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagee must serve a 
notice upon the mortgagor before exercising any rights under the mortgage.97 Upon 
expiration of a notice of default, the mortgagee has the right to enter into possession - is 
that sufficient to deny an interest to the grantee? As the mortgagee has the legal right to 
enter into possession, the equitable interest of the grantee cannot continue. This was the 
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decision of the New Zealand Court High Court in Trust Bank Central Ltd v Southdown 
Properties Ltd.98 
 
In that decision it was held that the crucial factor was that the mortgagee’s right to enter into 
possession had arisen, although it had not been exercised: 
...[the] equitable interest in the [fixtures] had been extinguished by the ripening of 
the [mortgagee’s] legal right to go into possession, despite the fact that it was not 
actually exercised....Until that point the right remained inchoate and was not 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the [chattel owner’s] interest.99 
 
The mortgagee had issued a notice of default, demanding the payment of arrears of 
interest. Upon expiry of that notice, the mortgagee had the right to enter into possession. 
The court held that the defendant, which had removed the fixtures which were subject to a 
Romalpa clause on the date the notice of default expired, had acted wrongfully. The 
equitable interest of the defendant had been extinguished by the fact that the mortgagee’s 
right to enter into possession had arisen although it had not been exercised. 
 
In ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd v Haines House Haulage Co Ltd,100 the 
mortgagee brought an action in damages for conversion or interference with its estate in the 
mortgaged land, against the defendant who had entered the land and removed a house. 
The defendant had provided the house to the mortgagor, subject to a Romalpa clause. The 
court found it unnecessary to express any views on the mortgagee’s submission that the 
equitable interest of the defendant was extinguished upon expiry of the notice issued under 
s92 Property Law Act 1952 (NZ).101 However, it was noted that the rights of the mortgagee 
were still inchoate to the extent that it had not entered into possession of the land and had 
not exercised its power of sale.102 From the judgment it appears that the crystallisation of 
the mortgagee’s interest occurs upon the entry into possession or the actual exercise of the 
power of sale: 
...until [the mortgagee’s] interest in the land under its mortgage crystallised, either 
by an entry into possession or an exercise of the right of sale, then [the defendant] 
was entitled to rely upon its agreement and to remove the house...103 
 
Since that decision, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has taken a different approach to the 
question.  The case of Trust Bank Central Ltd v Southdown Properties Ltd104 went on 
appeal in Whenuapai Joinery (1988) Ltd v Trust Bank Central Ltd.105  The registered 
mortgage included a clause prohibiting the removal of any improvements on the land 
without the written consent of the mortgagee. The appellant had affixed joinery to the land 
after the date of the mortgage. The joinery was subject to a Romalpa clause by which the 
appellant had the right to enter and remove the joinery if it was not paid for. The joinery was 
not paid for and the appellant removed it. The mortgagee sued the appellant for conversion. 
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The appellant sought to rely on Kay’s Leasing Corporation Pty Ltd v CSR Provident Fund 
Nominees Pty Ltd,106 claiming that its interest prevailed over that of the mortgagee. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the registered mortgagee enjoyed the benefits of 
indefeasibility, its interest being free of unregistered interests.107 Such protection extends to 
the conditions in the mortgage that related to the mortgagee’s interest and were an integral 
part of that interest. It was acknowledged by the court that there was no relationship 
between the appellant and the mortgagee, the registered mortgage being prior to the supply 
of the joinery. The mortgagee had no knowledge of the existence of the appellant, the 
contract between the appellant and the mortgagor (Southdown Properties Ltd), nor of the 
reservation of title clause until the removal of the joinery. However, due to the registration of 
the mortgage, the appellant breached the clause prohibiting the removal of fixtures. The 
express prohibition negated the implied consent that the mortgagor in possession of the 
land could deal with fixtures in the course of trade. The clause was an integral part of the 
mortgagee’s interest and therefore was protected by registration of the mortgage.  
 
The court also noted that despite the existence of the prohibition of removal in the mortgage 
instrument, the mortgagee had a right at law to prevent the removal of fixtures by parties 
with inferior interests, if the removal threatens the adequacy of the security.108 Estoppel, 
imposition of a constructive trust and unjust enrichment were all put forward as grounds in 
the appeal. The Court of Appeal rejected all of these submissions.109 The mortgagee’s right 
to priority to the fixtures was upheld by the court.  
 
[5.3] Effect of Severance of Fixtures 
A mortgagee having the power to sever fixtures, retains its interest in those items as they 
continue to form part of the security after severance. Fixtures revert to the status of chattels 
upon the severance from land.110 In Re Rogerstone Brick & Stone Co Ltd; Southall v 
Westcomb,111 it was argued that upon detaching the fixtures from the land, title revested in 
the mortgagor. Eve J dismissed this contention as absurd. By analogy, his Honour 
reasoned that if the mortgagor’s argument was furthered, it would mean that if there had 
been a sale of the leasehold property by the mortgagee, including the fixtures as attached 
to the property, the mortgagor would be entitled to possession of the fixtures upon 
severance by the purchaser of the property.112 
 
From the decision in Re Penning; Ex parte State Bank of South Australia,113 it appears that 
title to the severed fixtures does not revert to the mortgagor. Nor is the mortgagor entitled to 
the proceeds of sale of those fixtures. Severance without the appropriate authority does not 
necessarily mean that those fixtures no longer form part of the mortgagee’s security nor that 
the proceeds of sale are outside the ambit of the security.114  Upon severance, the fixtures 
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still form part of the mortgagee’s security and therefore the mortgagee will only be liable in 
damages if the wrongful severance diminishes the adequacy of the security.115 
 
Although a mortgagor may not regain title, what is the position of the grantee in respect of 
wrongfully severed fixtures? Applying the decisions of Re Penning; Ex parte State Bank of 
South Australia116 and Re Rogerstone Brick and Stone Co Ltd,117 wrongful severance does 
not change the fact that the reconverted chattels remain as part of the mortgagee’s security. 
In contrast is the reasoning in Whenuapai Joinery (1988) Ltd v Trust Bank Central Ltd.118 By 
wrongfully removing the joinery from the land, the joinery reverted in status to chattels, but 
this did not entitle the appellant to claim that the joinery no longer formed part of the 
mortgagee’s security. Wrongdoers cannot take advantage of their conduct. The court 
stated: 
[The mortgagee’s charge], representing as it does a registered interest in the land to 
which the joinery because affixed, must prevail over Whenuapai’s contractual right 
against Southdown to “recover possession” of the joinery.119 
It is interesting to note that the court refers to the appellant’s interest as a contractual right, 
not as an equitable interest. 
 
This is different to the Australian position as set by Re Penning; Ex parte State Bank of 
South Australia.120 In that case, wrongful severance of the fixtures did not prevent the 
wrongdoer, the mortgagee in that case, from benefiting from the wrongful act. The severed 
fixtures were held to remain as part of the mortgagee’s security. The mortgagee only liable 
in damages to the mortgagor if the removal caused loss. However, it could be argued that 
although the fixtures revert to the status of chattels, the mortgagee is not taking advantage 
of its wrongful act as such. The mortgagee is not relying on the change in the status of the 
fixtures to gain an advantage. A grantee would not be entitled to priority over the mortgagee 
merely because the fixtures have been detached without the proper power.121 
 
In contrast, Christensen argues that “[o]nce the fixtures are severed they will no longer form 
part of the security if there is no power in the mortgage to sever and sell.”122 Christensen 
submits that a mortgagee would have no title to the severed chattels and that title would lie 
between the mortgagor and any party with an interest in the chattels.123 The commentator 
argues that the decision of Re Penning; Ex parte  State Bank of South Australia124 supports 
this view,125 that once fixtures could be severed to sell, the instrument must be registered as 
a bill of sale of chattels. Implicit in this decision is the acknowledgement that upon 
severance fixtures lose their characteristic of real property and revert to being chattels.  
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Christensen126 likens the process to that of the principle of “feeding the title” in Butterworth v 
Kingsway Motors.127 In that case the defective title in a car which a third party had 
possession, was perfected by payment of the amount owing under a hire-purchase 
agreement to the true owner of the car. It was held that this payment retrospectively 
perfected the defective title in the car. Christensen states: 
In the context of fixtures it could be argued that, by severing the chattel, the 
proprietary rights which passed to the owner of the land and then to the mortgagee 
by virtue of the mortgage document have been reconstituted, upon severance, in 
the supplier as owner of the goods...128 If this were applicable, clearly a grantee 
under a bill of sale would be entitled to priority over the mortgagor as the grantee’s 
interest had not been extinguished upon the annexation of the chattels to the 
mortgaged land. 
 
If either the mortgagee or the grantee has actually severed the fixtures from the land, 
common sense would dictate that the fixtures revert back to their original status of chattels. 
If a chattel by its annexation to land can become part of the land, by detaching it from the 
land, it must therefore lose its status of real property and revert to a chattel. If a grantee 
severs the fixtures before the mortgagee has entered into possession or exercised the 
power of sale, there is no wrongful severance and the title in the reconverted chattels is with 
the grantee. 
 
[6] Protection of the Grantee’s Interest 
The law of fixtures is firmly entrenched in the Australian law and until legislative reform, 
parties with interests in chattels that have been attached to land, will have to ensure that 
they take precautions to protect their interest. 
 
[6.1] Agreements Between Mortgagee and Grantee 
To protect its interest a grantee should obtain an express acknowledgment from each party 
with an interest in the land that the chattels are not fixtures, they do not form part of any 
security and the grantee is at all times entitled to enter the land to sever and remove the 
chattels.129 The agreement should be expressed to bind all successors and assigns to 
enable the covenant to be enforced against third parties. 
 
Hogg also suggests that there be an agreement between the grantee and the mortgagor. 
The bill of sale should include such terms as that the chattels remains the property of the 
grantee until payment; a prohibition against the mortgagor from attaching the chattels to the 
land; an acknowledgment that the chattels are attached only for their better use and 
enjoyment as chattels.130 
 
[6.2] Caveat 
The grantee’s equitable right in the mortgaged land is not capable of registration under the 
Torrens system as it is not an easement nor an incorporeal right. However, it may amount to 
a caveatable interest under s122 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). In Hazelwood v BP Australia 
Ltd,131 a chattel owner attempted to caveat its equitable interest. The court readily accepted 
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such an interest, but the caveat failed on the grounds it was defective in form. Cox J did not 
imply in his judgment that such an interest would be incapable of supporting a caveat.132 So 
far, this question has not been determined by the courts. 
 
Cooper advises against the right to lodge a caveat, based on the fact that if parties were 
entitled to protect their interests by caveat, practical difficulties would arise where a  
multitude of caveats were lodged in respect of one piece of land.133 
 
[6.3] Unjust Enrichment 
A claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment has been suggested as an obvious but as 
yet unutilised avenue of redress for parties whose interest in chattels is lost upon 
annexation to land of those chattels.134 It is beyond the scope of this article to examine this 
remedy, due to the complex nature and the development of the use of unjust enrichment as 
a cause of action. However, it should be noted that unjust enrichment was raised in 
Whenuapai Joinery (1988) Ltd v Trust Bank Central Ltd135 and was rejected by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal. 
 
[7] Conclusion 
A grantee’s interest in chattels subject to a bill of sale are, to say the least, precarious when 
the chattels are attached to mortgaged land so as to become fixtures. Under the doctrine of 
fixtures, the chattels will form part of the security and as such, the mortgagee will be entitled 
to priority in nearly all situations. A grantee must act quickly upon the default of the 
mortgagor under the terms of the bill of sale, to seize the chattels before the mortgagee 
enters into possession of the land or exercises the power of sale. Despite the recognition of 
the unusual equitable interest in the land on which the chattels are kept, the grantee’s 
interest will be overruled upon the mortgagee exercising its rights under the mortgage.  In 
New Zealand, the position of the grantee is even more precarious. Once a mortgage 
becomes registered, the interest of the grantee in any chattel that has, or may become, a 
fixture is not recognised under strict application of the principles of the Torrens system. 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission investigated personal property securities and in its 
report recommended that chattels that become fixtures should continue to be governed by 
land law. The security interest in the chattel is extinguished upon the annexation to the land, 
but it was recommended that it should be provided that upon the detachment of the chattels 
from the land, the security interests in the chattels should be revived.136 It is submitted that 
this does not go far enough to recognise and protect the interests of grantees. The grantee 
will still lose its right to the chattels that have been affixed, if the mortgagee does not sever 
them. It would not be possible for a grantee to seek to regain title to chattels that have been 
severed from the land from a purchaser of the land upon the exercise of mortgagee’s power 
of sale. Such a purchaser would be a bona fide purchaser for value. 
 
The right to enter and seize chattels under a bill of sale should exist until the owner of the 
land upon which the chattels have been affixed, elects to keep those fixtures and pay for 
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them. The interest of the grantee should be recognised despite any annexation to land and 
despite a mortgagee exercising any powers under its mortgage. Until legislative reform is 
carried out, the only possible avenue open to a grantee is to enter into various agreements 
in an effort to protect his or her interest in the chattel under the bill of sale. This safeguard 
leads to added expense in the business of securities and leads to the necessity of 
registration under the Bills of Sale and Other Instruments Act 1955 (Qld) being called into 
question. Reform is needed to enable ordinary commercial activities to be carried out 
without regard to an outdated and archaic principle such as the doctrine of fixtures.  
 
